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Call for Papers
Dialogue and Representation

IADA — International Association for Dialogue Analysis
13th International Conference on Dialogue Analysis

www.dialogue-representation.org
April 26-30, 2011
Université de Montréal, Québec, Canada

Deadline for proposals: September 1, 2010
Deadline for submission of full papers: March 1, 2011

Keynote Speakers

Éric GRILLO, Université Sorbonne Nouvelle Paris 3, France
Cornelia ILIE, Örebro University, Sweden
Alain LÉTOURNEAU, Université de Sherbrooke, Canada
Wolfgang TEUBERT, University of Birmingham, United Kingdom
Karen TRACY, University of Colorado at Boulder, United States
Edda WEIGAND, University of Münster, Germany

Conference Theme

The object-of-study ‘dialogue’ and its representation

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Upon opening my e-mail this morning I found a forward of this article from the New York Times on the popular fact-checking website snopes.com. I found the article interesting for more than a few reasons.

What has always fascinated me about Snopes is how it evolved organically online out of a felt need for objectivity. Since the beginning the web has always been a fertile breeding ground for rumors, urban legends and half-truths, and people (who I think are more sophisticated than we often believe) know this.  They are well aware of the multiple, conflicting biases that color the information they find online.  They know that these biases can lead to slanting and distortion, and to some degree they expect it.  For those who are not simply looking for confirmation of their own viewpoints, this is a problem.  Simply knowing that bias abounds on the web, however, is not a sufficient defense.  People with this kind of interest don’t want just any story, they want the story.  They want to know what really happened.  The multiple, conflicting accounts available online don’t tell them that.  The result is that people who want to use the web for information gathering purposes have to have some way of sifting the facts out of the voluminous chaff of rumor, exaggeration, and partisan cheerleading in which they lay hidden.

Enter Snopes, which as the article explains, evolved into its role as a “fact-checking” site.  (It did not start out that way.)  Nevertheless, it is now regarded by many as an authority on which stories are and are not credible on the web.

To my mind two things stand out from the article. The first is this quote:

For the Mikkelsons, the site affirms what cultural critics have bemoaned for years: the rejection of nuance and facts that run contrary to one’s point of view.

“Especially in politics, most everything has infinite shades of gray to it, but people just want things to be true or false,” Mr. Mikkelson said. “In the larger sense, it’s people wanting confirmation of their world view.”

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ARGMAS 2010 Toronto

Seventh International Workshop on
Argumentation in Multi-Agent Systems (ArgMAS 2010)

Toronto, Canada, May 10, 2010

In Conjunction with AAMAS 2010
Workshop web site:
 http://homepages.inf.ed.ac.uk/irahwan/argmas/argmas10/
ArgMAS series web site:
 http://homepages.inf.ed.ac.uk/irahwan/argmas/

Overview

This workshop will focus on the concepts, theories, methodologies, and applications of computational models of argumentation in building autonomous agents and multi-agent systems. Argumentation can be abstractly defined as the formal interaction of different arguments for and against some conclusion (eg, a proposition, an action intention, a preference, etc.). An agent may use argumentation techniques to perform individual reasoning, in order to resolve conflicting evidence or to decide between conflicting goals.   Multiple agents may also use dialectical argumentation in order to identify and reconcile differences between themselves, through interactions such as negotiation, persuasion, and joint deliberation.
The main goal of this workshop will be to bring together the community of researchers working on argumentation in multi-agent systems.

The workshop has the following technical goals:
1.    To explore the use of argumentation in practical reasoning.
2.    To investigate how argumentation can be used to enable rational interaction between autonomous agents.
3.    To explore the applicability of argumentation for solving a variety of problems in multi-agent systems, such as information exchange, negotiation, team formation, deliberation, etc.
4.    To explore strategic reasoning and behaviour in argumentation-based interaction.
5.    To understand how argumentation relates to other areas of multiagent research, such as game theory, agent communications, and planning.
6.    To present and encourage implemented systems which demonstrate the use of argumentation in multi-agent systems.

The workshop aims at bridging the gap between the vast amount of work on argumentation theory and the practical needs of multi-agent systems research.

Workshop: NASSLLI 2010

The North American Summer School in Logic, Language, and Information (NASSLLI) is a summer school with classes in the interface between computer science, linguistics, and logic.

Website: http://www.indiana.edu/~nasslli/

After previous editions at Stanford University, Indiana University, and UCLA, NASSLLI will return to Bloomington, Indiana, June 20–26, 2010. The summer school, loosely modeled on the long-running ESSLLI series in Europe, will consist of a number of courses and workshops, selected on the basis of the proposals. Courses and workshops meet for 90 or 120 minutes on each of five days, June 21–25, and there will be tutorials on June 20 and a day-long workshop on June 26. The instructors are prominent researchers who volunteer their time and energy to present basic work in their disciplines. Many are coming from Europe just to teach at NASSLLI.

Who should attend? What will it be like?

NASSLLI courses are aimed at graduate students and advanced undergraduates in wide variety of fields. The instructors know that people will be attending from a wide range of disciplines, and they all are pleased to be associated with an interdisciplinary school. The courses will also appeal to post-docs and researchers in all of the relevant fields.

We hope to have 100-150 participants. In addition to classes in the daytime, the evenings will have social events and plenary lectures. Bloomington is a wonderful place to visit, known for arts, music, and ethnic restaurants. All of this is within 15 minutes walking from campus. We aim to make NASSLLI fun and exciting.

The Center for Research in Communication at the Faculty of Communication and Public Relations,
National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Bucharest, Romania
in cooperation with
Fulbright Commission Romania

is organizing the conference

Globalization and Changing Patterns in the Public Sphere

November 12-13, 2010, Bucharest, Romania

Details and instructions for authors can be had at the following links:

G&PS CFP

G&PS instructions for authors

Please feel free to circulate this CFP.

CALL FOR PAPERS:

SemDial 2o1o (PozDial)
14th WORKSHOP ON THE SEMANTICS AND PRAGMATICS OF DIALOGUE
Adam Mickiewicz University Poznań, Poland, 16-18 June, 2010

CALL FOR PAPERS (January 2o1o)
The SemDial series of workshops aims to bring together researchers working
on the semantics and pragmatics of dialogue in fields such as artificial
intelligence, computational linguistics, formal semantics/pragmatics,
philosophy, psychology, and neural science. SemDial 2010 will be the 14th
workshop in the SemDial series and it will be organized at the Institute of
Psychology (Chair of Logic and Cognitive Science), Adam Mickiewicz
University (AMU), Poznań. AMU is one of Poland’s largest institutions of
higher education, located in the historical city of Poznań.

WEBSITE: http://www.semdial2010.amu.edu.pl
E-MAIL: semdial@amu.edu.pl

Authors of best accepted papers will be invited to submit extended
versions to Dialogue & Discourse, the new open-access journal dedicated
exclusively to research on language ‘beyond the single sentence’
(http://www.dialogue-and-discourse.org).
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Rhetoric and Responsibility

It is common knowledge that political extremism is on the rise in the U.S..  I was listening to a radio broadcast in this series this morning, and the question came up of whether or not talk radio and television personalities who play to political extremes are morally responsible for the acts that some of their unbalanced listeners or viewers might do.  A case in point was the murder of George Tiller, a doctor in Kansas who Fox News’ Bill O’Reilly had several times condemned by name on the air for performing abortions. Tiller’s murderer apparently had been a fan of O’Reilly’s show.

Whether or not one thinks O’Reilly is implicated in Tiller’s death, it does seem to raise the question of whether and to what degree persons in his line of work bear responsibility for the attitudes that they model, and the overall quality of public discourse in the U.S..

My sense of things is that  people like Michael Moore and Bill O’Reilly probably don’t cause people to pick up guns unless those people are already deranged.  They do, however, signal that it is acceptable to be intolerant and abusive of people who disagree with one’s view of the world. It also encourages the polarization that is such a serious difficulty at this moment in American politics.  For these reasons it’s hard for me not to think that people who model intolerant or abusive political attitudes bear at least some responsibility for the political climate we have here.

The defense that what these folks do is all entertainment rings false to me.  I wouldn’t excuse a bully for haranguing a person in a public place on those grounds, and I don’t think the Glenn Becks of the world can get off the hook so easily either.  Even if all they wish to do is entertain, the fact is that their particular brand of entertainment has some very damaging consequences to which they ought to own up.

But if they bear responsibility, then this suggests that rhetorical activity is subject to moral constraints–perhaps not constraints on what a speech can contain in terms of ideas, but constraints on the manner in which the speech is given.  Perhaps another way to think of this is that there are moral limits to what one may do in adapting one’s speech to a particular audience.  Perhaps the notion of “pandering” captures those limits, but I’m not sure it’s the right moral category (rhetoricians, help me out).  What the talk radio people seem to me to do is something more akin, by degrees, to inciting riot. In an economic and political climate like the U.S. has right now, that seems to me to be decidedly immoral, and practically unwise.

Another Vote for Narratives

A while ago I posted a short entry here entitled Nice Argument. I’ll Believe You When You Have a Story.  That post linked to a post about the endowment effect on Dan Ariely’s blog in behavioral economics.  In that post I wondered if something like the endowment effect (the increased perception of value that comes from association with a personal narrative) might not do some explanatory work in argumentation theory, perhaps in terms of explaining why people hold and argue for the positions that they do, or why people can be resistant to changing their minds even when presented with evidence that should do so, etc..

Here now is another entry along those lines, this time by the redoubtable popularizer of all things brain science, Jonah Lehrer.  In a recent entry on his blog Lehrer goes so far as to say that in order to be effective argumentation–especially moral argumentation–ought to be aimed at exciting the emotional systems in the brain; that argumentation that appeals to rational considerations simply won’t get the job done when it comes to morality.  Let’s see now, if he’s right then moral argument is effective when it appeals to our sentiments, but is idle when it appeals to reason.  Seems like I’ve heard that one somewhere before…I wonder if Lehrer can do a Scottish accent.

What is interesting here for argumentation theorists in these developments coming out of the social and now the hard sciences are (1) that emotions apparently play a much larger role in reasoning, and by extension in effective argumentation than has traditionally been thought and (2) that arguments or not, narratives have what increasingly looks like a proven power to convince that in some cases can exceed rational appeals.  (Of course to some in rhetoric that won’t seem like news, however, considering that this observation is coming from the hard sciences I’d wager that even the toughest rhetorician may find something to smile about there). Though obviously related, these two points each have a significance of their own. The first point is in some ways a vindication of the more nuanced view taken by most argumentation theorists of what were traditionally seen the “emotion-based” fallacies (e.g. ad misericordiam, etc.). The second point certainly seems like wind in the sails of those who favor the notion that narratives can be arguments.

Apparently the gang over at Less Wrong think so, and they’ve got a paper that backs them up.  From the blog:

Mercier and Sperber argue that, when you look at research that studies people in the appropriate settings, we turn out to be in fact quite good at reasoning when we are in the process of arguing; specifically, we demonstrate skill at producing arguments and at evaluating others’ arguments.

Interesting stuff, especially given that by ‘argument’ here Mercier and Sperber, the paper’s authors, intend the attempt to persuade, not to rationally convince.  In a nutshell, their contention is that we reason better when we are trying to persuade others to adopt our point of view. Conversely, when we aim at the truth we do worse at being reasonable.  Hmmm.  🙂

Announcement and Call for Participation

WORKSHOP ON BAYESIAN ARGUMENTATION

Fri-Sat, October 22 & 23, 2010
Department of Philosophy & Cognitive Science
Lund University, Sweden
http://www.fil.lu.se/conferences/conference.asp?id=38&lang=se

Treatments of natural language argumentation by means of Bayes theorem (BT) are a compartively recent phenomenon. The basic idea behind (BT) is that the probability of a hypothesis increases to the extent that evidence is more likely if the hypothesis were true than if it were false. To fit this idea to natural language arguments (and episodes of reasoning thus suggested), the term ‘evidence’ is interpreted as reason or ground, and the term ‘hypothesis’ as conclusion or proposal. The choice always depends also on particular ways of drawing the distinction between theoretical and practical reasoning.

Amongst others, (BT) can be used as a measure for the rational assignment of degrees of belief in the face of new evidence. It also provides expression for qualitative demands such as the significance of the likelihood-difference between mutually exclusive, but equally data-fitting hypotheses or – in the non hypothesis-testing context – equally grounds-covering proposals. In principle, then, agreement and disagreement may be rationally constrained both within and across agents (including epistemic peers) by what effectively is a quantitative measure of relative argument strength.

Further applications of (BT) pertain, for example, to statistical fallacies and decision making under uncertainty. This international workshops seeks to collect recent results in this area, collect participant’s papers in a special issue of an international journal, and to explore avenues for future cooperation.

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