Apparently the gang over at Less Wrong think so, and they’ve got a paper that backs them up. From the blog:
Mercier and Sperber argue that, when you look at research that studies people in the appropriate settings, we turn out to be in fact quite good at reasoning when we are in the process of arguing; specifically, we demonstrate skill at producing arguments and at evaluating others’ arguments.
Interesting stuff, especially given that by ‘argument’ here Mercier and Sperber, the paper’s authors, intend the attempt to persuade, not to rationally convince. In a nutshell, their contention is that we reason better when we are trying to persuade others to adopt our point of view. Conversely, when we aim at the truth we do worse at being reasonable. Hmmm. 🙂
RAIL 
Hi, Steve: I think Sperber/Mercier are not trying to say that arguing makes us better reasoners, but that arguing makes us reasoners. If that’s the case, the ordinary activity of arguing is prior to distinctions between “persuading” and “rationally convincing”.
Hey Jean,
Sorry it’s taken so long to get back to your comment here. Let me begin by admitting that when I posted I hadn’t read the article as closely as I should have, and I think you’re right. 🙂
What’s more, I think *they’re* right. Most people have to be taught that distinction before they recognize it. That said, it makes me wonder if there’s not a conversation to have here about whether or not maintaining such a distinction. At present I’d say it does, because it offers a useful way for working on specific aspects of what people do when they argue. So long as all tasks are given their equal due, and we don’t assume (say) that persuasion is somehow immoral taken as a category of activity, or that rational convincing isn’t taken to be nothing more than logical hair-splitting, I think the distinction is kind of helpful. What do you think?