Archive for the ‘Workshops’ Category



From July 3 to July 6, 2018, the 9th Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA) will be held at the University of Amsterdam. The aim of the conference is to draw together scholars from a variety of disciplines that are working in the field of argumentation theory.


The keynote speakers are:


  • Marianne Doury (Centre national de la recherche scientifique, Paris)
  • Dale Hample (University of Maryland)
  • David Hitchcock (McMaster University)

The planning committee of the 9th ISSA Conference invites presentations of original, non-published work on argumentation. Argumentation theorists, (informal) logicians, discourse analysts, communication scholars, rhetoricians, legal scholars, AI scholars, and other scholars involved in the study of argumentation are all encouraged to take part.


Important dates



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Workshop on Argument Mining: Perspectives from Information Extraction, Information Retrieval and Computational Linguistics

9-10 July 2014, Dundee, Scotland


Submissions of position statement are invited for the SICSA Workshop on Argument Mining to be held in Dundee, Scotland.

Argument mining exploits the techniques and methods of natural language processing, or more specifically – text and opinion mining, for semi-automatic and automatic recognition and extraction of structured argument data from unstructured natural language texts. Lying at the intersection of sentiment analysis and computational models of argument, it is attracting increasing attention with an ACL workshop on the topic in Baltimore (http://www.uncg.edu/cmp/ArgMining2014/) and a meeting dedicated to the topic in Warsaw (http://argdiap.pl/argdiap2014).


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Argumentation, Rationality and Decision

Imperial College London, 18th-19th September 2014

Argumentation, initially studied in philosophy and law, has in recent years been the subject of extensive formal research in artificial intelligence and computer science. It provides representations and algorithms for reasoning with incomplete and possibly inconsistent information. Formalisms can be used to model decision-making by individual agents performing critical thinking or by multiple entities dialectically engaged to reach mutually acceptable decisions. However, so far there has been little engagement with the rich mathematical theories of decision, studied as part of microeconomic theory.

In turn, formal rational choice theory has paid little attention to the structure and content of arguments brought to bear on decisions. The outcomes of choices are typically assigned values treated as embodying a cardinal or ordinal preference relation, with decision rules identifying good choices according to various decision rules and under differing conditions of circumstantial knowledge (certainty, strict uncertainty, risk). However, when people make decisions, whether that process has been rational or not depends not only on the optimality of outcome, but also on the argumentative structure implicit in the person’s deliberation. The structure of argument is important, and arguments for and against choices are weighed against each other depending on how firm the reasons are from which the argument is formed.


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Aristotle on Bad Arguments

Leading Minds Research Project.
Leeds, UK
4-5th July, 2014

Why does Aristotle include knowledge of defective arguments within the arts of dialectic and rhetoric? On one attractive way of understanding the nature of Aristotelian rhetoric and dialectic, these are (in large measure) expertises in the use of good arguments and good reasoning to persuade others. How then should we explain the place Aristotle gives to defective arguments (merely apparent enthymemes / syllogisms / refutations, sophisms, and in general invalid and otherwise defective arguments) within his works on these expertises of dialectic and rhetoric (Topics, Sophistical Refutations and Rhetoric)? How should we understand his apparent recommendations regarding the use of such arguments? By what standards of propriety does he mark out arguments as “merely apparent syllogisms/enthymemes”, particularly given his famously “more relaxed” standards for genuine enthymemes in rhetoric?


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First Call for Papers


ArgDiaP 2014: the 12th ArgDiaP Conference “From Real Data to Argument Mining”

23-24 May 2014, Warsaw, Poland

IGSAR 2014: the 2nd Interdisciplinary Graduate School on Argumentation and Rhetoric “Corpus Analysis in Argument Studies”

21-24 May 2014, Warsaw, Poland

Submissions are invited for the 12th ArgDiaP conference “From Real Data to Argument Mining” to be held in Warsaw, Poland.

The 12th ArgDiaP conference is dedicated to argument mining. We will discuss techniques and methods for analyzing real data in natural arguments which will ultimately help us to automatically recognize and extract argumentative structures. The confirmed invited speakers are:

  • Prof. Fabio Paglieri (Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione — CNR, Rome, Italy)
  • Prof. Andrea Rocci (Istituto di Argumentazione, Linguistica e Semiotica, Universita della Svizzera Italiana, Lugano, Switzerland)
  • Prof. Patrick Saint-Dizier (Institut de Recherches en Informatique de Toulouse — CNRS, France).

Associated with the conference is the 2nd edition of the Interdisciplinary Graduate School on Argumentation and Rhetoric, IGSAR. Students will participate in two days of introductory tutorials (21-22 May) and in the ArgDiaP conference (23-24 May). Thanks to the financial support offered by the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education, students may apply for grants to cover a registration fee to participate in four days of IGSAR (accommodation and travel have to be covered by a participant). (more…)

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5th Biennial RSA Summer Institute
Lawrence, KS
June 3 – 9, 2013

The Institute will commence with five Seminars running from Monday to Friday, June 3-7, culminating in a plenary luncheon. After lunch on the 7th, twenty Workshops begin and will run to midday on Sunday, June 9th.

2013 Institute Schedule of Events

Registration for the 2013 RSA Summer Institute in Lawrence, KS is open! If you have been accepted into a Workshop or a Seminar (or if you are a session leader), it’s time to register. To do so, please visit http://www.continuinged.ku.edu/programs/rhetoric-society/. If you are a session leader or a graduate student, you will need a special code to receive the appropriate discounts. You should have received this code already. If you are not a session leader or a graduate student, you do not need a code to register. The Registration deadline is April 1, 2013.

Related news: Information on Lodging for the Institute can be found here:http://rhetoricsociety.org/aws/RSA/pt/sp/institute_lodging.


Seminar leaders:

David Zarefsky, Northwestern University
Robert C. Rowland, University of Kansas
Jean Goodwin, Iowa State University
Jeanne Fahnestock, University of Maryland
Frans H. van Eemeren, University of Amsterdam

Argumentation is the study of how people justify their acts, beliefs, attitudes, and values, and influence the thought and actions of others, by providing good reasons for the claims they make. This subfield includes both descriptive study (what do people consider to be good reasons and what are they doing when they offer what they take to be justifications?) and normative investigation (under what circumstances should claims be considered justified?). It addressesboth argumentation in general and argumentation in specific contexts such as law, business,science, religion, and public affairs. (more…)

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7th eColloq on Argumentation
Thursday April 11, 4-6 pm GMT+1  (Amsterdam, Berlin, Rome, Stockholm)
4.00-4.10 Connect, Welcome
4.10-4:35 Bart Verheij (Groningen, The Netherlands):
Defeasible rule-based arguments with a logico-probabilistic foundation
Abstract: A theory of defeasible arguments is proposed that combines logical and probabilistic properties. This logico-probabilistic argumentation theory builds on two foundational theories of nonmonotonic reasoning and uncertainty: the study of nonmonotonic consequence relations (and the associated minimal model semantics) and probability theory. A key result is that, in the theory, qualitatively defined argument validity can be derived from a quantitative interpretation. The theory provides a synthetic perspective of arguments `jumping to conclusions’, rules with exceptions, and probabilities. The approach is compared to Pollock’s computational model of argumentation OSCAR, designed on the basis of his well-developed positions concerning the relations between argumentation, logic and probability. In contrast with Pollock’s OSCAR, the present approach is compatible with the standard probability calculus.
4:35-4:50 Discussion
4:50-5:00 Break
5:00-5:25 Emmanuel J. Genot (Lund University, Sweden):
The Myth of a Confirmation Bias (Arguments for a better argumentative theory of reasoning)
Abstract: Wason, confronted with an apparent instance of the Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent in his empirical Selection Task, hypothesized a “Confirmation Bias” (CB) to be responsible for subjects’ selections [4]. When Bayesian rational analysis of the selection task (RAST, [3]) substituted a richer probabilistic semantics to Wason’s truth-functional semantics, subjects’ selection emerged as being vindicated, and evidence for CB (in fact, any bias) vanished. Relevance Theorists later produced data that Bayesian models could not accommodate [1], yet without exhibiting evidence for biases of any sort. However, Relevance Theory has more recently been superseded by the Argumentative Theory of Reasoning (ATR, [2]), in which CB has returned with a vengeance, backed by an evolutionary narrative that pits “argumentative” and “logical” competences against one another. I will argue that this narrative is a remnant of the same truncated view of logic (and semantics) that informed Wason’s theorizing, but that argumentation-theoretic considerations are necessary to account for the data. To support this view, I will present a generalization of RAST that accounts for both standard and non-standard cases of ST (resp. from [3, 4] and [1]) once argumentative goals are “factored in,” but with an underlying semantics that undermines the very idea of “logical competence”—without which the CB is but a myth.
Girotto, Kemmelmeier, Sperber & van der Henst. “Inept reasoners or pragmatic virtuosos? Relevance and the deontic selection task”, Cognition, 2001, 81, B69-B7
Mercier & Sperber, Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2011, 34, 57-74.
Oaksford & Chater. A Rational Analysis of the Selection Task as Optimal Data Selection. Psychological Review, 1994, 101, 608-631
Wason, Reasoning About a Rule. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1968, 20, 273-281
5:25-5:40 Discussion
Discussants (preliminary list)
Nir Oren (University of Aberdeen, UK)
David Hitchcock (McMasters, Canada)
Thomas Gordon (Berlin, Germany)
Jean Goodwin (Iowa State, USA)
Iowan Drehe (University of Cluj-Napoca, Romania)
Sune Holm Petersen (Copenhagen University, Denmark)
Steven Patterson (Marygrove College, Detroit, USA)
Sarah Uckelman (Ruprecht-Karls Universität Heidelberg, Germany)
Marcin Lewinski (New University of Lisbon, Portugal)
Thomas Fischer (University of Houston, Texas, USA)
To participate as a discussant (just “sitting in” is in fact fine!), please review the links under “TechThings” at the above website (to test your hardware) and contact the organizer at frank.zenker@fil.lu.se.
Frank Zenker
Department of Philosophy & Cognitive Science
Kungshuset, Lundagård, 222 22 Lund, Sweden

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