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Archive for March, 2010

It is common knowledge that political extremism is on the rise in the U.S..  I was listening to a radio broadcast in this series this morning, and the question came up of whether or not talk radio and television personalities who play to political extremes are morally responsible for the acts that some of their unbalanced listeners or viewers might do.  A case in point was the murder of George Tiller, a doctor in Kansas who Fox News’ Bill O’Reilly had several times condemned by name on the air for performing abortions. Tiller’s murderer apparently had been a fan of O’Reilly’s show.

Whether or not one thinks O’Reilly is implicated in Tiller’s death, it does seem to raise the question of whether and to what degree persons in his line of work bear responsibility for the attitudes that they model, and the overall quality of public discourse in the U.S..

My sense of things is that  people like Michael Moore and Bill O’Reilly probably don’t cause people to pick up guns unless those people are already deranged.  They do, however, signal that it is acceptable to be intolerant and abusive of people who disagree with one’s view of the world. It also encourages the polarization that is such a serious difficulty at this moment in American politics.  For these reasons it’s hard for me not to think that people who model intolerant or abusive political attitudes bear at least some responsibility for the political climate we have here.

The defense that what these folks do is all entertainment rings false to me.  I wouldn’t excuse a bully for haranguing a person in a public place on those grounds, and I don’t think the Glenn Becks of the world can get off the hook so easily either.  Even if all they wish to do is entertain, the fact is that their particular brand of entertainment has some very damaging consequences to which they ought to own up.

But if they bear responsibility, then this suggests that rhetorical activity is subject to moral constraints–perhaps not constraints on what a speech can contain in terms of ideas, but constraints on the manner in which the speech is given.  Perhaps another way to think of this is that there are moral limits to what one may do in adapting one’s speech to a particular audience.  Perhaps the notion of “pandering” captures those limits, but I’m not sure it’s the right moral category (rhetoricians, help me out).  What the talk radio people seem to me to do is something more akin, by degrees, to inciting riot. In an economic and political climate like the U.S. has right now, that seems to me to be decidedly immoral, and practically unwise.

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A while ago I posted a short entry here entitled Nice Argument. I’ll Believe You When You Have a Story.  That post linked to a post about the endowment effect on Dan Ariely’s blog in behavioral economics.  In that post I wondered if something like the endowment effect (the increased perception of value that comes from association with a personal narrative) might not do some explanatory work in argumentation theory, perhaps in terms of explaining why people hold and argue for the positions that they do, or why people can be resistant to changing their minds even when presented with evidence that should do so, etc..

Here now is another entry along those lines, this time by the redoubtable popularizer of all things brain science, Jonah Lehrer.  In a recent entry on his blog Lehrer goes so far as to say that in order to be effective argumentation–especially moral argumentation–ought to be aimed at exciting the emotional systems in the brain; that argumentation that appeals to rational considerations simply won’t get the job done when it comes to morality.  Let’s see now, if he’s right then moral argument is effective when it appeals to our sentiments, but is idle when it appeals to reason.  Seems like I’ve heard that one somewhere before…I wonder if Lehrer can do a Scottish accent.

What is interesting here for argumentation theorists in these developments coming out of the social and now the hard sciences are (1) that emotions apparently play a much larger role in reasoning, and by extension in effective argumentation than has traditionally been thought and (2) that arguments or not, narratives have what increasingly looks like a proven power to convince that in some cases can exceed rational appeals.  (Of course to some in rhetoric that won’t seem like news, however, considering that this observation is coming from the hard sciences I’d wager that even the toughest rhetorician may find something to smile about there). Though obviously related, these two points each have a significance of their own. The first point is in some ways a vindication of the more nuanced view taken by most argumentation theorists of what were traditionally seen the “emotion-based” fallacies (e.g. ad misericordiam, etc.). The second point certainly seems like wind in the sails of those who favor the notion that narratives can be arguments.

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Apparently the gang over at Less Wrong think so, and they’ve got a paper that backs them up.  From the blog:

Mercier and Sperber argue that, when you look at research that studies people in the appropriate settings, we turn out to be in fact quite good at reasoning when we are in the process of arguing; specifically, we demonstrate skill at producing arguments and at evaluating others’ arguments.

Interesting stuff, especially given that by ‘argument’ here Mercier and Sperber, the paper’s authors, intend the attempt to persuade, not to rationally convince.  In a nutshell, their contention is that we reason better when we are trying to persuade others to adopt our point of view. Conversely, when we aim at the truth we do worse at being reasonable.  Hmmm.  🙂

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Announcement and Call for Participation

WORKSHOP ON BAYESIAN ARGUMENTATION

Fri-Sat, October 22 & 23, 2010
Department of Philosophy & Cognitive Science
Lund University, Sweden
http://www.fil.lu.se/conferences/conference.asp?id=38&lang=se

Treatments of natural language argumentation by means of Bayes theorem (BT) are a compartively recent phenomenon. The basic idea behind (BT) is that the probability of a hypothesis increases to the extent that evidence is more likely if the hypothesis were true than if it were false. To fit this idea to natural language arguments (and episodes of reasoning thus suggested), the term ‘evidence’ is interpreted as reason or ground, and the term ‘hypothesis’ as conclusion or proposal. The choice always depends also on particular ways of drawing the distinction between theoretical and practical reasoning.

Amongst others, (BT) can be used as a measure for the rational assignment of degrees of belief in the face of new evidence. It also provides expression for qualitative demands such as the significance of the likelihood-difference between mutually exclusive, but equally data-fitting hypotheses or – in the non hypothesis-testing context – equally grounds-covering proposals. In principle, then, agreement and disagreement may be rationally constrained both within and across agents (including epistemic peers) by what effectively is a quantitative measure of relative argument strength.

Further applications of (BT) pertain, for example, to statistical fallacies and decision making under uncertainty. This international workshops seeks to collect recent results in this area, collect participant’s papers in a special issue of an international journal, and to explore avenues for future cooperation.

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Have a look at this interesting sequence of images by David J. Staley over at Kairos.  When you get there give it a few minutes to cycle through all the images.  This series of images is put forward as a visual argument.  Clearly it’s visual (well mostly, at any rate), but is it an argument?  If so, what is the conclusion of the argument and what are the premises?

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Call for Papers: Special Issue of Argumentation and Advocacy on Public Argument and Digital Media

Almost ten years ago, bloggers spurred public argument about Trent Lott’s controversial toast to a retiring Strom Thurmond. Since then, digital intermediaries using a variety of forms–blogs, podcasts, wikis, photo and video, social networking sites, and microblogs–have influenced innumerable episodes of public deliberation. This special issue of Argumentation and Advocacy calls for submissions that investigate public argument occurring through digital media. We especially seek essays that probe how digital media produce novel argument forms and modes of advocacy, historical analysis of digitally-driven deliberative episodes, and critical approaches to transformations in the nature of public argument. Submissions should be completed by June 1, 2010, and will be competitively reviewed. The special issue will be guest edited by Damien Smith Pfister, and published under Argumentation and Advocacy’s new co-editorship of Catherine H. Palczewski and John Fritch.

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Clicking here will take you to an interview with Frans van Eemeren, where he covers a number of topics regarding the applicability and usefulness of the pragma-dialectic method for folks working in the social sciences.  Though the blog is in French, the interview is in English.

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