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I hadn’t heard of this before, but in a very interesting article on his blog Predictably Irrational (after the excellent book of the same name) behavioral economist and theorist about rationality Dan Ariely describes what he calls the endowment effect:

[T]he endowment effect [is] the theory that once we own something, its value increases in our eyes.  […]

But ownership isn’t the only way to endow an object or service with meaning. You can also create value by investing time and effort into something (hence why we cherish those scraggly scarves we knit ourselves) or by knowing that someone else has (gifts fall under this category).

And then there’s the power of stories: spend a fantastic weekend somewhere, and no matter what you bring back – whether it’s an upper-case souvenir or a shell off the beach – you’ll value it immensely, simply because of its associations.

I’ve got to think that this effect is something in which argumentation theorists and researchers should have an interest, as it seems to fit handily into accounts of all sorts of biases and blind spots that hobble the abilities of persons to think critically about their own positions or standpoints as well as those of others.  Of particular interest is that research like Ariely’s might help to explain why a conclusion often seems more compelling to many people when the speaker relates her particular path to arriving at it in the form of a narrative rather than by giving an argument for it.

You can read the full story, which includes the account of Ariely’s recent experiment on the endowment effect here.

Teaching Controversy

Here is a short video by A. C. Grayling on the question of whether there is a pedagogical obligation to teach both creationism and evolutionary theory in science classes:

I tend to think that Grayling is right. Teaching creationism next to evolution does seem to treat as worthy of serious consideration a view that simply isn’t–at least not in the domain of science. (That’s not to say that creationism and it’s implications might not be worthy of serious consideration in different domains–perhaps in religious studies courses.)   I wonder, however, what this says about the teaching of opposing viewpoints in general.   It is hard to deny the intuitive pull towards the idea that we are morally–and rationally–obligated to hear all sides of a controversy before making up our minds. Call this the “equal consideration norm.”  When all the standpoints at issue are feasible it seems a sensible enough norm to follow.  However, there are several controversies in contemporary public life where at least one side seems to trade on this otherwise intuitive principle to get it’s standpoint into debates where those standpoints might have a tougher time getting serious consideration on their own merits.  The climate change controversy comes to mind as another example, apart from the one Grayling discusses in the video, that fits this pattern. I’m sure the reader can think of others.

What do we teach our students about navigating between the “equal consideration norm” and judging standpoints on their merits?  Do we do our students a disservice when we neglect a particular “side” in controversies like these, in violation of the “equal consideration norm”?  If not, when are we licensed to say that a particular standpoint in a controversy doesn’t merit serious consideration? Under what conditions do we allow the even stronger judgment that it would it be wrong to accord to a standpoint the honor of serious treatment of a controversial issue (the way that Grayling thinks it is wrong to include the creationist standpoint in scientific discussions of human origins or cosmology)?

Supposing we can work out satisfactory answers to the above questions, what ought we to teach our students about how to draw the line between views that merit serious discussion and those that do not without falling prey to prejudiced or biased modes of thinking?

2ND COPENHAGEN CONFERENCE IN EPISTEMOLOGY:
THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

THE UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN

AUGUST 19-20, 2010

We tend to think of liberal democracy as providing the most ethically defensible way to set up a modern society. A separate yet highly relevant issue is whether liberal democracies also are preferable from an epistemological perspective, i.e., from the point of view of promoting true over false belief, knowledge over ignorance, and so on. The purpose of this conference-and of the research project that it is part of-is to investigate the norms, practices, and institutions that determine how belief and knowledge is acquired and transmitted in liberal democracies. Questions to be addressed include but are not limited to the following:

– Under what conditions is free speech a truth-conducive social arrangement?

– When can we trust each others’ testimony?

– What is the proper response to disagreement, including disagreements among experts?

– What is the proper role of scientific expertise in democratic decision making?

– How is the need for expertise to be balanced against the desire for adequate representation?

– What are the epistemological properties of social deliberation?

CONFIRMED SPEAKERS

Speakers include David Christensen (Brown), Jerry Gaus (Arizona), Stephan Hartmann (Tilburg), Rainer Hegselmann (Bayreuth), Vincent Hendricks (Copenhagen), Michael Lynch (UConn), Erik J. Olsson (Lund), and Duncan Pritchard (Edinburgh).

CALL FOR PAPERS

We cordially invite you to submit a 500 word abstract on any topic relevant to the conference theme. Please prepare your abstract for anonymous review. Abstracts should be submitted (as a plain text, MS Word, or PDF file) to cph.epistemology@gmail.com no later than April 1, 2010. Decisions regarding acceptance will be made within two weeks.

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Jonathan Baron’s interesting article on the phenomenon of “belief-overkill” in the vol. 29  no.4 (2009) issue of Informal Logic (a special issue on psychology and argumentation) got me thinking a bit about the relationship between rationality and tolerance for tension between one’s beliefs.  Baron’s hypothesis was that subjects would adjust their views of policy proposals by a candidate for public office according to their views about separate, internally unconnected policy proposals of the same candidate. This is the phenomenon he calls “belief-overkill” in the article.  Baron’s expectations, as the article reports, were supported by his results.  In his study, the subjects did show tendencies towards belief-overkill.  According to Baron, belief-overkill seems to be linked to an individual’s tolerance for conflict among their beliefs.  Those with a low tolerance for such conflicts were more likely to exhibit a tendency towards belief-overkill. Those with higher tolerances were, accordingly, less likely to exhibit such a tendency.  If, like me, you had friends who seemed to have no discernible economic views at all prior to the Iraq war who suddenly and without discernible reason began quoting Friedrich Hayek on a regular basis the minute they put magnetic yellow ribbons on their cars, this article explains a lot.

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Call for Proposals for RSQ 2011 Special Issue

RSQ invites proposals for the 2011 special fifth issue. The fifth issue will be a themed publication developed by a Guest Editor, with the aim of enabling the journal to help set the intellectual agenda in rhetorical studies, to encourage focused statements on timely topics in rhetorical studies by scholars working in related areas, to attract participation by top scholars, and to stimulate scholarly activity within the RSA, such as pre-conference colloquia, convention sessions, or RSA workshops.

Proposals should identify the Guest Editor, provide a descriptive rationale of no more than 500 words, a list of authors, as well as a brief discussion (150-250 words) of each individual essay. The rationale should demonstrate the timeliness of the topic, discuss how the topic falls within the scope of RSQ as described in its general submission guidelines, and where applicable, address the proposal’s relationship to other similar-themed issues or edited collections, and note the qualifications of its guest editor and contributors to speak to the field on the topic’s behalf.

The special fifth issue is allotted the same amount of space as the regular four quarterly issues, 102 pages, which will accommodate a guest editor’s introduction and 4-6 articles totaling 40,000 words.  It will be published in the fall of 2011.

Deadline for proposal submission: February 15, 2010

RSA will make available to the guest editor up to $1,000 reimbursement for expenses related to the special issue. First drafts of manuscripts for the selected proposal will be due in mid-January 2011; final versions will be due June 1.

Please submit proposals electronically to:

Debra Hawhee, RSQ Associate Editor for Special Issues, hawhee@psu.edu

Read the CFP in French, Italian, German, or Spanish

The Eighteenth Biennial Conference of the International Society for the History of Rhetoric (ISHR) will be held in Bologna, Italy, from Monday, July 18th to Friday, July 22, 2011. The biennial Conference of ISHR brings together several hundred specialists in the history of rhetoric from around thirty countries. This will be the first meeting of the Society in Italy since 1993.

SCHOLARLY FOCUS OF THE CONFERENCE

The Society calls for papers that focus on the historical aspect of the theory and practice of rhetoric. In honor of the origin of the University of Bologna the main theme of the Conference will be “Rhetoric and Law”. Papers dedicated to this theme will explore points of contact between rhetoric and law and their mutual influence through the centuries.
Papers are also invited on every aspect of the history of rhetoric in all periods and languages and the relationship of rhetoric to poetics, literary theory and criticism, philosophy, politics, art, religion, geographic areas and other elements of the cultural context.

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Read the CFP in French

International symposium organized by the CRAL (Centre de recherches sur les arts et le langage), CNRS/EHESS, as part of a French-Mexican research project. It will be held in Paris, at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, September 7th – 9th, 2010.

Persuasion has long been opposed to argumentation. From this standpoint, conviction would pertain only to argumentation because it is based on reason, whereas persuasion would rest on techniques of manipulation aimed at producing an effect on the audience. Perelman, for instance, even though he put emphasis on the importance of the audience, nevertheless defended a universally valid conception of rationality whose goal is to convince a universal audience, whereas persuasion is oriented toward a particular audience. Yet this opposition has been qualified by what is called, since Hamblin’s seminal work, the “pragmatic turn” of argumentation, as argumentation always occurs in a given context, limiting its scope to the context in which it occurs.

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International Institute for Argumentation Studies Amsterdam

This Summer School, to be taught by the research group Argumentation in Discourse, focuses on the analysis and evaluation of strategic manoeuvring in argumentative discourse in various argumentative activity types (political, medical, legal, etc.). The Summer School will be held from Monday, July 5, to Friday, July 9. Participation is open to all international PhD students specializing in argumentation or having a strong interest in argumentation. The participation fee, which includes lunches and receptions, is € 150,- . Lodging is not included, but will be offered against reduced rates. Because no more than 20 PhD students can be admitted to the course, interested students are advised to register as soon as possible. If you want to participate, please send an e-mail to Bart Garssen.

2009: The Year in Argumentation

With only one week left in 2009 it’s time to look back on the year’s events.  No look back for argumentation scholars would be complete without some rememberence of Stephen Toulmin, whose recent death was a great loss to the community of argumentation scholars.  Readers who wish to do so can read Prof. Toulmin’s obituary in the New York Times by clicking here.  Condolences are due to those who were students of Stephen Toulmin, or who knew him or his family personally.

But good things happened too. Though we all stay pretty busy, it’s also true that we can’t follow everything that happens and as a result we miss things.  This is especially true in an international and interdisciplinary study like argumentation theory.  Bearing that in mind, I’m wondering what, in your view, were the year’s high points for argumentation theory?  Were there any books or articles that marked the year for you as a particularly important one?  What developments happened this year that you think were significant, but expect that others might have missed?

For my part, I’d say that the combination of the CRRAR Summer Institute and OSSA 2009 would have to be at the top of my list for the year.   I’m also excited about the launch of the new journal Cogency, which I think will bring great things in the near  future.  (Not that I imagine that many people didn’t know about either of those those things. 🙂 )

What do you think? What were the year’s high points for you?

LRR10: LOGIC, REASONING AND RATIONALITY

http://www.lrr10.ugent.be/

September 20-22, 2010

Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Ghent University, Belgium

The idea that there is a strong connection between logic, reasoning, and rationality, which was very popular among the philosophers of the Wiener Kreis, has long been out of  fashion. Findings from history and philosophy of science and from cognitive psychology have revealed that the traditional logician’s tool, Classical Logic, is not fit for explicating human reasoning either in the sciences or in everyday life. Times have changed, however. Today, a multiplicity of formal frameworks (ranging from non-classical  logics over probability theory to Bayesian networks) is available in addition to Classical Logic. Also, historians and philosophers of science as well as psychologists have described a rich variety of patterns in both scientific and common sense reasoning.

The aim of LRR10 is to stimulate the use of formal frameworks to explicate concrete  examples of human reasoning and, conversely, to challenge scholars in formal studies by presenting them with interesting new examples of actual reasoning. Therefore, we welcome papers in all areas related to non-classical logics and non-classical formal frameworks. We also welcome case studies from history and philosophy of science, as well as from psychology, that enhance our apprehension of concrete reasoning patterns that occur in the sciences and in everyday life. Finally, we welcome contributions that deal with the philosophical implications of the present-day insights for our understanding of rationality.

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