Feeds:
Posts
Comments

Archive for the ‘Discussion’ Category

The Twelve Virtues of Rationality (!)

Posted in Discussion, Rationality, tagged , , , on January 21, 2010| Leave a Comment »

I found this interesting post on the twelve virtues of rationality on the blog of artificial intelligence researcher Eliezer Yudkowski.   The fifth virtue, you’ll be happy to know, is argument. 🙂

Read Full Post »

Nice Argument. I’ll Believe You When You Have a Story.

Posted in Connections, Discussion, Rationality, tagged , , , , , on January 15, 2010| 6 Comments »

I hadn’t heard of this before, but in a very interesting article on his blog Predictably Irrational (after the excellent book of the same name) behavioral economist and theorist about rationality Dan Ariely describes what he calls the endowment effect:

[T]he endowment effect [is] the theory that once we own something, its value increases in our eyes.  […]

But ownership isn’t the only way to endow an object or service with meaning. You can also create value by investing time and effort into something (hence why we cherish those scraggly scarves we knit ourselves) or by knowing that someone else has (gifts fall under this category).

And then there’s the power of stories: spend a fantastic weekend somewhere, and no matter what you bring back – whether it’s an upper-case souvenir or a shell off the beach – you’ll value it immensely, simply because of its associations.

I’ve got to think that this effect is something in which argumentation theorists and researchers should have an interest, as it seems to fit handily into accounts of all sorts of biases and blind spots that hobble the abilities of persons to think critically about their own positions or standpoints as well as those of others.  Of particular interest is that research like Ariely’s might help to explain why a conclusion often seems more compelling to many people when the speaker relates her particular path to arriving at it in the form of a narrative rather than by giving an argument for it.

You can read the full story, which includes the account of Ariely’s recent experiment on the endowment effect here.

Read Full Post »

Teaching Controversy

Posted in Discussion, Teaching on January 13, 2010| 3 Comments »

Here is a short video by A. C. Grayling on the question of whether there is a pedagogical obligation to teach both creationism and evolutionary theory in science classes:

I tend to think that Grayling is right. Teaching creationism next to evolution does seem to treat as worthy of serious consideration a view that simply isn’t–at least not in the domain of science. (That’s not to say that creationism and it’s implications might not be worthy of serious consideration in different domains–perhaps in religious studies courses.)   I wonder, however, what this says about the teaching of opposing viewpoints in general.   It is hard to deny the intuitive pull towards the idea that we are morally–and rationally–obligated to hear all sides of a controversy before making up our minds. Call this the “equal consideration norm.”  When all the standpoints at issue are feasible it seems a sensible enough norm to follow.  However, there are several controversies in contemporary public life where at least one side seems to trade on this otherwise intuitive principle to get it’s standpoint into debates where those standpoints might have a tougher time getting serious consideration on their own merits.  The climate change controversy comes to mind as another example, apart from the one Grayling discusses in the video, that fits this pattern. I’m sure the reader can think of others.

What do we teach our students about navigating between the “equal consideration norm” and judging standpoints on their merits?  Do we do our students a disservice when we neglect a particular “side” in controversies like these, in violation of the “equal consideration norm”?  If not, when are we licensed to say that a particular standpoint in a controversy doesn’t merit serious consideration? Under what conditions do we allow the even stronger judgment that it would it be wrong to accord to a standpoint the honor of serious treatment of a controversial issue (the way that Grayling thinks it is wrong to include the creationist standpoint in scientific discussions of human origins or cosmology)?

Supposing we can work out satisfactory answers to the above questions, what ought we to teach our students about how to draw the line between views that merit serious discussion and those that do not without falling prey to prejudiced or biased modes of thinking?

Read Full Post »

A Foolish Consistency? Baron on Belief-overkill

Posted in Discussion, Informal Logic, Rationality, tagged , , , , on January 11, 2010| Leave a Comment »

Jonathan Baron’s interesting article on the phenomenon of “belief-overkill” in the vol. 29  no.4 (2009) issue of Informal Logic (a special issue on psychology and argumentation) got me thinking a bit about the relationship between rationality and tolerance for tension between one’s beliefs.  Baron’s hypothesis was that subjects would adjust their views of policy proposals by a candidate for public office according to their views about separate, internally unconnected policy proposals of the same candidate. This is the phenomenon he calls “belief-overkill” in the article.  Baron’s expectations, as the article reports, were supported by his results.  In his study, the subjects did show tendencies towards belief-overkill.  According to Baron, belief-overkill seems to be linked to an individual’s tolerance for conflict among their beliefs.  Those with a low tolerance for such conflicts were more likely to exhibit a tendency towards belief-overkill. Those with higher tolerances were, accordingly, less likely to exhibit such a tendency.  If, like me, you had friends who seemed to have no discernible economic views at all prior to the Iraq war who suddenly and without discernible reason began quoting Friedrich Hayek on a regular basis the minute they put magnetic yellow ribbons on their cars, this article explains a lot.

(more…)

Read Full Post »

2009: The Year in Argumentation

Posted in Discussion on December 22, 2009| Leave a Comment »

With only one week left in 2009 it’s time to look back on the year’s events.  No look back for argumentation scholars would be complete without some rememberence of Stephen Toulmin, whose recent death was a great loss to the community of argumentation scholars.  Readers who wish to do so can read Prof. Toulmin’s obituary in the New York Times by clicking here.  Condolences are due to those who were students of Stephen Toulmin, or who knew him or his family personally.

But good things happened too. Though we all stay pretty busy, it’s also true that we can’t follow everything that happens and as a result we miss things.  This is especially true in an international and interdisciplinary study like argumentation theory.  Bearing that in mind, I’m wondering what, in your view, were the year’s high points for argumentation theory?  Were there any books or articles that marked the year for you as a particularly important one?  What developments happened this year that you think were significant, but expect that others might have missed?

For my part, I’d say that the combination of the CRRAR Summer Institute and OSSA 2009 would have to be at the top of my list for the year.   I’m also excited about the launch of the new journal Cogency, which I think will bring great things in the near  future.  (Not that I imagine that many people didn’t know about either of those those things. 🙂 )

What do you think? What were the year’s high points for you?

Read Full Post »

Must an Argument have True Premises?

Posted in Discussion, Informal Logic, tagged , , , on December 16, 2009| 1 Comment »

Arguments from Hamblin, Chapter 7
David Hitchcock’s diagram of Hamblin’s arguments against requiring true premises. (photos: Kelly Webster, editing: Steve Patterson)

This past Summer I had the great good fortune to participate in the Summer Institute in Argumentation hosted by CRRAR.  The Summer Institute preceded the OSSA conference, so the whole experience turned out to be about two and half weeks of really great discussions on all kinds of topics in argumentation theory and rhetoric.

One of the topics that’s been bouncing around in the back of my thoughts since then has been the question of whether or not an argument must have true premises in order to be good.  The question was raised in a fantastic session on Chapter 7 of Hamblin’s Fallacies that was led by David Hitchcock during the Summer Institute.  Hamblin, of course, answers this question in the negative, and I think it fair to say that the consensus of most of those attending agreed with him in that. For my part, I’ve been mulling it over since then and a few thoughts are beginning to emerge.

(more…)

Read Full Post »

« Newer Posts