Announcement and Call for Participation
WORKSHOP ON BAYESIAN ARGUMENTATION
Fri-Sat, October 22 & 23, 2010
Department of Philosophy & Cognitive Science
Lund University, Sweden
http://www.fil.lu.se/conferences/conference.asp?id=38&lang=se
Treatments of natural language argumentation by means of Bayes theorem (BT) are a compartively recent phenomenon. The basic idea behind (BT) is that the probability of a hypothesis increases to the extent that evidence is more likely if the hypothesis were true than if it were false. To fit this idea to natural language arguments (and episodes of reasoning thus suggested), the term ‘evidence’ is interpreted as reason or ground, and the term ‘hypothesis’ as conclusion or proposal. The choice always depends also on particular ways of drawing the distinction between theoretical and practical reasoning.
Amongst others, (BT) can be used as a measure for the rational assignment of degrees of belief in the face of new evidence. It also provides expression for qualitative demands such as the significance of the likelihood-difference between mutually exclusive, but equally data-fitting hypotheses or – in the non hypothesis-testing context – equally grounds-covering proposals. In principle, then, agreement and disagreement may be rationally constrained both within and across agents (including epistemic peers) by what effectively is a quantitative measure of relative argument strength.
Further applications of (BT) pertain, for example, to statistical fallacies and decision making under uncertainty. This international workshops seeks to collect recent results in this area, collect participant’s papers in a special issue of an international journal, and to explore avenues for future cooperation.
