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Archive for January, 2010

Teaching Controversy

Here is a short video by A. C. Grayling on the question of whether there is a pedagogical obligation to teach both creationism and evolutionary theory in science classes:

I tend to think that Grayling is right. Teaching creationism next to evolution does seem to treat as worthy of serious consideration a view that simply isn’t–at least not in the domain of science. (That’s not to say that creationism and it’s implications might not be worthy of serious consideration in different domains–perhaps in religious studies courses.)   I wonder, however, what this says about the teaching of opposing viewpoints in general.   It is hard to deny the intuitive pull towards the idea that we are morally–and rationally–obligated to hear all sides of a controversy before making up our minds. Call this the “equal consideration norm.”  When all the standpoints at issue are feasible it seems a sensible enough norm to follow.  However, there are several controversies in contemporary public life where at least one side seems to trade on this otherwise intuitive principle to get it’s standpoint into debates where those standpoints might have a tougher time getting serious consideration on their own merits.  The climate change controversy comes to mind as another example, apart from the one Grayling discusses in the video, that fits this pattern. I’m sure the reader can think of others.

What do we teach our students about navigating between the “equal consideration norm” and judging standpoints on their merits?  Do we do our students a disservice when we neglect a particular “side” in controversies like these, in violation of the “equal consideration norm”?  If not, when are we licensed to say that a particular standpoint in a controversy doesn’t merit serious consideration? Under what conditions do we allow the even stronger judgment that it would it be wrong to accord to a standpoint the honor of serious treatment of a controversial issue (the way that Grayling thinks it is wrong to include the creationist standpoint in scientific discussions of human origins or cosmology)?

Supposing we can work out satisfactory answers to the above questions, what ought we to teach our students about how to draw the line between views that merit serious discussion and those that do not without falling prey to prejudiced or biased modes of thinking?

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2ND COPENHAGEN CONFERENCE IN EPISTEMOLOGY:
THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

THE UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN

AUGUST 19-20, 2010

We tend to think of liberal democracy as providing the most ethically defensible way to set up a modern society. A separate yet highly relevant issue is whether liberal democracies also are preferable from an epistemological perspective, i.e., from the point of view of promoting true over false belief, knowledge over ignorance, and so on. The purpose of this conference-and of the research project that it is part of-is to investigate the norms, practices, and institutions that determine how belief and knowledge is acquired and transmitted in liberal democracies. Questions to be addressed include but are not limited to the following:

– Under what conditions is free speech a truth-conducive social arrangement?

– When can we trust each others’ testimony?

– What is the proper response to disagreement, including disagreements among experts?

– What is the proper role of scientific expertise in democratic decision making?

– How is the need for expertise to be balanced against the desire for adequate representation?

– What are the epistemological properties of social deliberation?

CONFIRMED SPEAKERS

Speakers include David Christensen (Brown), Jerry Gaus (Arizona), Stephan Hartmann (Tilburg), Rainer Hegselmann (Bayreuth), Vincent Hendricks (Copenhagen), Michael Lynch (UConn), Erik J. Olsson (Lund), and Duncan Pritchard (Edinburgh).

CALL FOR PAPERS

We cordially invite you to submit a 500 word abstract on any topic relevant to the conference theme. Please prepare your abstract for anonymous review. Abstracts should be submitted (as a plain text, MS Word, or PDF file) to cph.epistemology@gmail.com no later than April 1, 2010. Decisions regarding acceptance will be made within two weeks.

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Jonathan Baron’s interesting article on the phenomenon of “belief-overkill” in the vol. 29  no.4 (2009) issue of Informal Logic (a special issue on psychology and argumentation) got me thinking a bit about the relationship between rationality and tolerance for tension between one’s beliefs.  Baron’s hypothesis was that subjects would adjust their views of policy proposals by a candidate for public office according to their views about separate, internally unconnected policy proposals of the same candidate. This is the phenomenon he calls “belief-overkill” in the article.  Baron’s expectations, as the article reports, were supported by his results.  In his study, the subjects did show tendencies towards belief-overkill.  According to Baron, belief-overkill seems to be linked to an individual’s tolerance for conflict among their beliefs.  Those with a low tolerance for such conflicts were more likely to exhibit a tendency towards belief-overkill. Those with higher tolerances were, accordingly, less likely to exhibit such a tendency.  If, like me, you had friends who seemed to have no discernible economic views at all prior to the Iraq war who suddenly and without discernible reason began quoting Friedrich Hayek on a regular basis the minute they put magnetic yellow ribbons on their cars, this article explains a lot.

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